Was it because of the machine guns they carried? The Breda 30s? Heard they had multiple issues that necessitated a lot of work to reload and maintain those weapons.
Was it because of the machine guns they carried? The Breda 30s? Heard they had multiple issues that necessitated a lot of work to reload and maintain those weapons.
While I am not Historynerd, the Breda 30 was indeed a weapon that was much more...finnicky that most. I would argue it is even worse than the Nambu pistol, in fact - especially given that the first couple of production runs for those (the Nambu) were of high quality, before war-time resource problems and mass-production became problems.
And in regard to the Breda, it sucked. The recoil operation was violent, if the magazine was damaged it became inoperable, the Breda suffered from a lot of ammunition cook-offs due to poor heat management, low rate of fire, and was very prone to stoppages. The oiling system which was used to lubricate each bullet was prone to damage, the fully-automatic feature of the weapon was almost unusable due to the aforementioned problems, and it was on par with a semi-automatic rifle in terms of realistic Rate-of-Fire.
And the worst thing? The Italians had nothing else to replace it with, as the better MMGs and SMGs were very, very, very rare.
Was it because of the machine guns they carried? The Breda 30s? Heard they had multiple issues that necessitated a lot of work to reload and maintain those weapons.
This is the infantry squad as resulting from the 1938 reforms of the Regio Esercito, the infamous "Pariani reforms" (from General Alberto Pariani, Chief of Staff, who authored it); a much criticized reorganization of the whole army, that basically increased the number of divisions by reducing the number of infantry regiments in each from three to one, thus critically weakening them.
On the small units level, it meant that the infantry platoon went from three 12-men riflemen squads and 3 LMGs to two 18-men squads and 4 LMGs. This was meant to streamline as much as possible the maneuver, so the riflemen squad fought together, with no planned subdivisions for more articulated operations in the field. On the infantry company level, there were no other weapons but rifles and LMGs; the light mortars and MGs were at batallion level, whereas heavy mortars and AT guns were at regimental level.
In other words, the infantry was basically rich only in men, and with low fire capability, despite the theoretical ability to detach heavier weapons from the batallion or the regiment when needed. Whereas the rifle (Carcano Mod. 91) could still be considered tolerable enough despite its small 6.5 mm calibre (there is a lot of bad rep going on about it, but I feel it's exaggerated, and that, all considered, the 6.5 mm calibre for a bolt-action rifle wasn't a meaningful tactical disadvantage), the LMG was a poor weapon, but unfortunately it was the only one relatively widespread.
On the other side, the heavy (8 mm) MGs were rarer, but not that rare as Kuso said; while they had a low-ish rate of fire because of the feed tray system, they were decidedly more reliable, fired a reasonably powerful bullet and were more appreciated. Too bad that there is still a legend going around that they too needed the cartridge to be oiled, which is completely false.
I'll just put here that in 1940 the biggest issue of the Regio Esercito wasn't the weapons themselves, was the sheer firepower available to its units. Just compare the Italian infantry batallion (36 LMGs, 8 MGs and 18 light mortars) with a contemporary British one (22 AT rifles, 50 LMGs, 12 light and 2 heavy mortars, plus 10 Bren Carriers), and we can see why the latter could reasonably outmatch the former.
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As for the Breda 30, it was a poor weapon indeed. Other than its unreliability and complexity, if the 6.5 mm calibre was still tolerable for a rifle, it was unacceptable for an automatic weapon. In fact, the decision (taken too late, and reversed by 1940) to adopt the 7.35 mm calibre was taken arguably more due to the need of such bullet to have good performance for full auto weapons rather than its unsuitability or obsolescence for individual weapons (as the RE wanted to use a single calibre for all infantry weapons, reasonably so).
This is the infantry squad as resulting from the 1938 reforms of the Regio Esercito, the infamous "Pariani reforms" (from General Alberto Pariani, Chief of Staff, who authored it); a much criticized reorganization of the whole army, that basically increased the number of divisions by reducing the number of infantry regiments in each from three to one, thus critically weakening them.
On the small units level, it meant that the infantry platoon went from three 12-men riflemen squads and 3 LMGs to two 18-men squads and 4 LMGs. This was meant to streamline as much as possible the maneuver, so the riflemen squad fought together, with no planned subdivisions for more articulated operations in the field. On the infantry company level, there were no other weapons but rifles and LMGs; the light mortars and MGs were at batallion level, whereas heavy mortars and AT guns were at regimental level.
In other words, the infantry was basically rich only in men, and with low fire capability, despite the theoretical ability to detach heavier weapons from the batallion or the regiment when needed. Whereas the rifle (Carcano Mod. 91) could still be considered tolerable enough despite its small 6.5 mm calibre (there is a lot of bad rep going on about it, but I feel it's exaggerated, and that, all considered, the 6.5 mm calibre for a bolt-action rifle wasn't a meaningful tactical disadvantage), the LMG was a poor weapon, but unfortunately it was the only one relatively widespread.
On the other side, the heavy (8 mm) MGs were rarer, but not that rare as Kuso said; while they had a low-ish rate of fire because of the feed tray system, they were decidedly more reliable, fired a reasonably powerful bullet and were more appreciated. Too bad that there is still a legend going around that they too needed the cartridge to be oiled, which is completely false.
I'll just put here that in 1940 the biggest issue of the Regio Esercito wasn't the weapons themselves, was the sheer firepower available to its units. Just compare the Italian infantry batallion (36 LMGs, 8 MGs and 18 light mortars) with a contemporary British one (22 AT rifles, 50 LMGs, 12 light and 2 heavy mortars, plus 10 Bren Carriers), and we can see why the latter could reasonably outmatch the former.
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As for the Breda 30, it was a poor weapon indeed. Other than its unreliability and complexity, if the 6.5 mm calibre was still tolerable for a rifle, it was unacceptable for an automatic weapon. In fact, the decision (taken too late, and reversed by 1940) to adopt the 7.35 mm calibre was taken arguably more due to the need of such bullet to have good performance for full auto weapons rather than its unsuitability or obsolescence for individual weapons (as the RE wanted to use a single calibre for all infantry weapons, reasonably so).
Thanks for the detailed and informative write-up. I knew we could always count on you to provide information on the Italian Armed Forces, as well as to clear up multiple misconceptions often perpetuated in English sources.
Thanks for the detailed and informative write-up. I knew we could always count on you to provide information on the Italian Armed Forces, as well as to clear up multiple misconceptions often perpetuated in English sources.
Once again, thank you.
You're welcome.
I don't know exactly its origin, but the idea that it was the quality of Italian weaponry that made the difference is fundamentally wrong, if we talk about 1940 (three years later, it's valid, no discussion there). Not enough attention has been given to the tactical formations, and the role they played in the woes that Italian units had to face against pretty much everyone, and the attempts to correct this (for the matter I discussed before, it came to nothing unfortunately).